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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Municipal Towing Ordi-
nance Authorizing the Assessment of Towing Fees and Storage
Charges Without Notice and Opportunity for Hearing Violates
Due Process. Remm v. Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1976).
On December 30, 1975, plaintiff Remm parked his car on a street
in the city of New Orleans.' Thereafter, the police ticketed the car
and towed it to the police auto pound. Pursuant to the New Orleans
City Towing Ordinance,' the pound refused to surrender Remm's
automobile without first receiving payment of the towing charges
and accrued storage fees.3
Plaintiff Remm challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance
on due process grounds in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana.' The court concluded that the ordi-
nance deprived the owner of two property interests: (1) the access
to and use of the vehicle;' and (2) an interest in the fees collected
before the vehicle is released.' Relying primarily on Fuentes v.
Shevin,7 it found the New Orleans City Towing Ordinance to be
violative of the Federal Constitution because it denied the owner of
the impounded vehicle procedural due process.'
1. Remm v. Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1976).
2. NEW ORLEANS, LA. CODE § 38-274. Id. at 544.
3. Id. at 543. There are no provisions directing the pound to notify the owner or to provide
a hearing before the money is collected. An attempt at notice is required prior to sale or
disposition of the car by the pound. Id. at 544.
Any unoccupied vehicle of any kind or description whatever found violating any
traffic law shall be removed immediately and impounded by any police officer or duly
authorized person and shall only be surrendered . . . upon payment of fifteen dollars
($15.00) hereby declared to be the towing fee covering such impounding. [The] owner
shall thereafter have the responsibility of separately disposing of the violation charge
NEW ORLEANS, LA. CODE § 38-274.
The owner receives the parking ticket upon the return of his car after the payment of the
storage charges and towing fees. He has the option of either pleading guilty and paying the
ticket or contesting it. If he decides on the latter a trial date will be set and he must post a
bond to assure his appearance. The amount of the bond is equal to the minimum fine in the
particular situation. If he is found not guilty, the pound will return the fee paid. Id.
4. Id. at 543.
5. Id. at 545.
6. Id.
7. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
8. 418 F. Supp. at 548.
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Due process protection of property interests as defined by Fuentes
requires that a person receive notice of and an opportunity for a
hearing before his property is seized.' An exception was made for
extraordinary situations which involve a government interest that
demands prompt action.'0 Applying this view, the district court rea-
soned that the seizure of a car constitutes an extraordinary situation
because of the need for immediate action to insure public safety and
to regulate traffic." Thus, the section authorizing the seizure was
upheld. However, the section authorizing the collection of the tow-
ing charge and storage fees was found unconstitutional because
there was no immediate need to collect the money before the owner
had an opportunity to be heard.'" Consequently, an extraordinary
situation did not exist to justify the denial of due process.
In general, the deprivation of life, liberty, and property without
due process is prohibited by the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution.'3 Due process decisions involve
two steps: (1) a determination of whether an interest (in life, liberty,
or property) has been affected; and (2) a determination of the type
of hearing required, if any.' 4 Regardless of the type of hearing
granted, the opportunity for a hearing "granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner,"' 5 is essential to due process.
The Supreme Court in the early 1970s began to expand the types
of interests that the due.process clause protected.'6 One particular
area of change from the common law involved the right of a property
holder in summary seizures (attachment, garnishment, replevin, or
government seizures). Traditionally, a balancing test weighing the
various interests at stake was used to determine which interests
would be afforded due process protections.'7 Under this analysis
9. 407 U.S. at 96-97.
10. Id. at 90-91.
11. 418 F. Supp. at 545.
12. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V, and XIV, §1.
14. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
570-72 (1972).
15. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
16. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601, 610 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolee's right to due process in revoca-
tion of parole); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits).
17. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
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property interests were secondary in importance to life and liberty,
with the consequence that the res in question could be attached or
garnished without prior notice, hearing, or judicial order.'8 For ex-
ample, in Phillips v. Commissioner, the Court said "[w]here only
property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial en-
quiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the
ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate.""
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 0 the Supreme Court al-
tered the traditional application of procedural due process to pre-
judgment remedies. The Court held that a creditor may not garnish
a debtor's wages before the debtor has received notice and been
afforded the opportunity to question the garnishment." Instead of
balancing various interests (whether governmental or private)
against each other, Mr. Justice Douglas considered the nature of the
property deprived and said that wages were a "specialized type of
property"" whose garnishment "may as a practical matter drive a
wage-earning family to the wall. 2 3 The Court, however, did not
determine that the usual attachment proceedings were unconstitu-
tional. Rather, it distinguished this case by concluding that the
general rule does not satisfy every situation. 4
The reasoning of the Sniadach Court resulted in the formation of
two divergent views as to which property interests required pre-
seizure hearings." One followed the Sniadach holding strictly and
viewed a pre-seizure notice and a hearing as applying only to gar-
18. The rationale was to secure the creditor's interest in the property so that judgment
could be satisfied. See Coffin Brothers v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).
19. 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931). Application of this view of due process can be found in
pre-Fuentes cases involving towing ordinances. In 1972, the New York City Towing Ordinance
and corresponding state statutes were questioned on due process grounds in Cohen v. City of
New York, 69 Misc. 2d 189; 329 N.Y.S. 2d 596 (Civ. Ct. 1972). The challenge in Cohen was
similar to Remm in that the seizure of the vehicle was before the owner had been afforded a
determination of guilt or innocence. The court simply stated that due process does not require
an initial judicial determination if there is an opportunity for a subsequent hearing. 69
Misc.2d at 192, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
20. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
21. Id. at 342. The statute in Wisconsin gave the creditor ten days after the service of the
garnishee to serve the debtor. Upon the service of the garnishee the wages could be frozen.
In this particular case service of the debtor and the garnishee took place on the same day.
Id. at 338-39.
22. Id. at 340.
23. Id. at 341-42.
24. Id. at 340.
25. Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1976).
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nishment cases. 6 The other view, which was adopted in broad terms
by Fuentes, interpreted Sniadach as invalidating the traditional
procedures in most cases."
Writing for the majority in Fuentes, Mr. Justice Stewart held that
a person's interest in his property is entitled to due process before
the seizure of that property, 8 except in extraordinary situations. 9
At issue in Fuentes were the Florida and Pennsylvania pre-
judgment replevin statutes which permitted summary seizure of
property based on an ex parte application to the court clerk who
then issued a writ of replevin10 Although neither statute provided
for notice nor a hearing prior to the seizure," Florida required the
complainant to pursue his claim to legal title in court." The Penn-
sylvania statute had no such provision.3
The rationale behind the Fuentes decision was "to protect [the]
use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to
minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property,
a danger that is especially great when the state seizes goods simply
upon the application of and for the benefit of a private party."" In
addition to minimizing the instances of arbitrary seizures the Court
redefined the type of interest that would be protected by due pro-
cess. It found that the significance of the property in terms of its
"necessity" was not a factor, because the protections of due process
apply whether or not necessities are involved." Rather, the justices
decided that a possessory interest in property was enough to invoke
the due process clause, regardless of whether the possessor has full
title. Furthermore, the Court found that a temporary and non-final
deprivation denies a person his possessory interest even if it appears
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 407 U.S. at 96-97.
29. Id. at 90.
30. Id. at 69.
31. Id. at 70.
32. Id. at 74.
33. Id. at 77-78.
34. Id. at 81. The Court makes a distinction between summary seizure by the state for
the benefit of a private person and seizure by the state for the state's own interest.
35. Id. at 88-90.
36. Id. at 84. Although considering a pure possessory interest to be a property interest,
the Court did not discuss or further refine the concept. What constitutes a property interest
has been defined differently in other cases. Board of Regents v. Roth spoke of a property
interest in terms of a legitimate claim of entitlement. See fn. 20, supra.
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that the result of a final hearing would deprive the person of perma-
nent possession."
The Court did not believe that a later hearing or damage award
would be sufficient to remedy the wrong that had already taken
place." However, the opinion did not clarify what procedures would
be considered appropriate to insure that due process is afforded,
beyond requiring some type of notice or hearing prior to the sei-
zure.
3 9
Although it adopted a strict view regarding the deprivation of
property through the usual summary seizure procedures, the
Fuentes Court recognized the need in extraordinary situations for
retaining summary power in the government." Situations consid-
ered to be extraordinary are those involving a government need or
policy which must be executed." To meet this need, the decision
provided for a limited exception which permits seizure of the res
prior to a notice or hearing in an extraordinary situation if certain
conditions are met. First, the situation must necessitate a seizure
to secure an important governmental or public interest. Second,
there must be a need for prompt action. Third, there must be strict
governmental control over the seizure and only a government offi-
cial can initiate it. Finally, standards must be enumerated in a
narrowly drawn statute to govern the official's discretion in deter-
mining whether a seizure is necessary and justified." Through these
requirements the Court tried to contain abuse of the power granted
to the state by requiring the state to control strictly the use of the
force. 3
The Florida and Pennsylvania statutes were viewed as having
abdicated state control since an official was not involved in the
37. 407 U.S. at 84-87.
38. Id. at 82. "This Court has not ... embraced the general proposition that a wrong
may be done if it can be undone." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1971).
39. Id. at 80-82.
40. Id. at 90-91.
41. Phillips, Revolution And Counterrevolution: The Supreme Court on Creditors'
Remedies, 3 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1 (1975). An example of an extraordinary situation is found
under the Internal Revenue Code which provides that the Commissioner may begin a proce-
dure which would result in a levy on the taxpayer's assets if he finds that taxes which are
due or owing from a certain taxpayer will be jeopardized by delay in collection. 26 U.S.C. §
6861 (1970); C.I.R. v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 618-19 (1976).
42. 407 U.S. at 91.
43. Id. at 90-93.
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mechanism which brought about the seizure." Not only did the
officials abdicate their control, but the statutes also did not differ-
entiate among the types of situations which would justify a seizure.
Consequently, the state power was used by private parties to rem-
edy private disputes in which neither the government nor the public
had an interest."
The Fuentes analysis was applied in Graff v. NichoU1,4 a case
which preceded Remm and involved the validity of a towing ordi-
nance. An abandoned car had been towed after notice to the owner
but prior to any opportunity for a hearing.47 This procedure com-
plied with the city of Chicago's towing ordinance which drew a
distinction between cars that presumptively were abandoned either
because they were in a state of disrepair or had not been moved in
several days and cars that were parked illegally and thus created a
hazard." As to the latter category, the ordinance authorized an
immediate tow prior to notice or a hearing. In regard to the former
category, it designated a waiting period for cars which had not been
moved. 9 However, no such time period was indicated for cars in
disrepair. The ordinance apparently authorized an immediate tow
prior to a hearing, but as a matter of practice notice was routinely
given.50 The court did not find the entire ordinance invalid but held
that the section authorizing the removal of abandoned cars without
notice or the opportunity for a hearing was unconstitutional because
the circumstances did not demand prompt action as evidenced by
the waiting period in both instances. Furthermore, the vehicles did
not present an extraordinary situation, such as creating a hazard,
which would demand government action.5
44. Id. at 93.
45. Id. at 92.
46. 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. I1. 1974).
47. Id. at 978.
48. Id. at 980.
49. Id. at 982.
50. Id.
51. Id. For other cases involving different types of towing ordinances, see Stypmann v.
Neider, 70-2312 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (towing and impoundment of vehicles by private garagekee-
pers); Stephens v. Tielsch, 73-73C2 (W.D. Wash.) rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 1360 (9th
Cir. 1974); Seals v. Nicholl, 378 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (seizure of a prisoner's car);
Freidus v. Leary, 66 Misc. 2d 70, 320 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. Cty. 1971), rev'd, 38 App. Div. 2d
919, 329 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1st Dept. 1972) (reasonableness of towing removal charge).
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Remm v. Landrieu2 followed a similar line of reasoning in its
analysis of the New Orleans City Ordinance which authorized the
seizure of cars allegedly violating the traffic laws. The decision rests
on two factors: (1) the procedures set out by the towing ordinance
result in the deprivation of property interests; and (2) Fuentes' due
process analysis remains functional.
The court in Remm found that the city had enforced the ordi-
nance in two phases and that within each there was a deprivation
of property without prior notice or hearing.13 Initially, the owner of
the car was denied access to and the use of his vehicle as a result of
the actual towing.54 In applying the Fuentes analysis to this phase,
the court determined that the municipality had the responsibility
of regulating its streets and that the seizure of cars to clear a public
street represented an extraordinary situation in which due process
can be denied. The court found that the requirements of an extraor-
dinary situation as defined in Fuentes were met: (1) the seizure was
necessary to protect the interest of local municipalities in regulating
the use of the streets; (2) prompt action was necessary to insure
public safety and convenience; and (3) a city official made the de-
termination that there was a violation and was guided by standards
detailed in a narrowly drawn statute. 5
Remm found the second portion of the ordinance authorizing the
collection of the towing charge and storage fees unconstitutional. 6
The court distinguished between the property interests involved in
the seizure of the car and the assessment and payment of fees. 7
After concluding that the actual seizure was justified under the
extraordinary situation exception, the Remm court found that the
assessment and mandatory collection of the storage charges and
towing fees without a hearing denied the owner due process and that
the extraordinary situation exception was not applicable."
Judge Sear considered the city's interest in this phase to be the
collection of the storage charges and towing fees from those who
52. 418 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1976).
53. Id. at 545.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 418 F. Supp. at 545.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 546.
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were guilty of a traffic violation. 9 However, the payment of the
storage charges and towing fees was not treated in the same manner
as the parking fine. There was no opportunity for a hearing before
the pound collected the storage and towing fees. This differed from
the procedure for the collection of the parking ticket fine where a
hearing could be requested and payment postponed pending the
outcome." The towing fees and storage charges were collected re-
gardless of guilt or innocence. This procedure raised questions not
only of due process but also of creating a presumption of guilt.
Because a car would presumptively not have been towed unless it
was parked in violation of the traffic laws, the mere towing of the
car is in essence a charge against the owner of having violated these
laws.
The court further found that this portion of the towing ordinance
did not fulfill the other requirements set out in the definition of an
extraordinary situation. There was no apparent need for prompt
action." If the city could wait to collect the fine for the parking
ticket violation it could postpone the collection of the towing fees
and storage charges from owners who desired to contest the ticket.
Finally, the government official who collected the towing fees and
storage charges was not guided by the standards of a narrowly
drawn statute. The ordinance did not distinguish between actual
violators and alleged violators. Rather, it called for payment of the
fees and charges by all owners of impounded cars."
If the city were interested in collecting the charges and fees from
the guilty, the court suggested that the posting of a bond would be
the proper procedure. This constitutional device would both insure
the court appearance of those who wished to contest the ticket and
satisfy the city's monetary interest in collecting from traffic viola-
tors."
It seems evident from the procedures required by the existing
ordinance that the city was interested in collecting the storage
charges and towing fees regardless of guilt or innocence, 4 and that
59. Id. at 545.
60. Id. at 545-46.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 418 F. Supp. at 545.
64. Id. at 544.
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the payment was really a fine. Moreover, the posting of a bond
would not alter the present method of operation of the pound. The
officials would collect money, be it a fee for the posting of the bond
or payment of the storage charges and towing fees, at the same time.
Under the present ordinance, an owner must pay the storage charges
and towing fees regardless of his intention to contest the parking
ticket. If he later challenges the ticket and is found innocent the
storage charges and towing fees would be returned."5 If the owner
had put up a bond, the payment for the bond would be returned if
he were found innocent. Consequently, the only real distinction be-
tween the two situations appears to be in name; nevertheless, the
court felt that a bond requirement would comply with the Constitu-
tion.
Since the decision in Fuentes, the composition of the Court has
changed," resulting in a confused situation where Fuentes was im-
plicitly overruled 7 and then, two days later, revived." In Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant & Co.,69 a case factually similar to Fuentes, the
majority (which dissented in Fuentes) ° abandoned the strict rule of
Fuentes and used the more traditional balancing of interests test.'
The Mitchell Court found that the summary seizure procedures set
out in the Louisiana statute were constitutional and that a creditor
65. Id.
66. Jonnett v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., con-
curring). The majority in Fuentes was composed of Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall. Justices White, Burger and Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion. Justices Powell
and Rehnquist did not participate as the arguments were heard before they joined the bench,
407 U.S. at 68.
67. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant and Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
68. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
69. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
70. Justices White, Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist and Powell composed the majority in
Mitchell with the first three dissenting in Fuentes. See, fn. 66 supra.
71. 416 U.S. at 635, fn. 8 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 416 U.S. at 603-12.
72. Id. at 605-06. The Louisiana statute set out the following procedure in order to ob-
tain a writ of sequestration: (1) The grounds for obtaining a writ are the possibility that the
debtor will waste or dispose of the property. Writ is available only upon the submission of a
verified petition or affidavit setting out the specific nature of the claim, the amount involved
and the specific grounds. (2) A judge must review the petition and only he is empowered to
issue the writ. (3) The creditor must file a bond which would be sufficient to cover all the
debtor's damages if the debtor prevails in court. (4) There is no provision for notice or a prior
hearing. After the seizure the debtor is entitled to an immediate dissolution of the writ unless
the creditor can prove his grounds. If the creditor can not meet the burden, then the court
must order the property to be returned to the debtor with any damages which includes
attorney's fees. The debtor can also regain possession immediately after the seizure by posting
a bond.
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could seize a debtor's property without prior notice or a hearing. 3
The Court considered that both the debtor and creditor held
"current, real interests"74 in the property, but found that the credi-
tor's interest in either being paid or securing possession of the goods,
undiminished in value as a result of deterioration,75 took precedence
over the debtor's interest in possession.7" This decision represented
a change from the Fuentes view that the interests of the debtor took
precedence over the creditor.77
Although Mitchell appeared to reflect a decision by the Court to
limit the application of Fuentes, the Court a few days later relied
on the extraordinary situation exception of Fuentes in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.7" The case involved the seizure
of a vessel pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto
Rico."8 This statute specifically stated that vessels would be seized
only when transporting certain illegal property which was clearly
designated in the statute." Additionally, the officials responsible for
initiating the seizure were designated.'
The Calero Court evidently felt that the statute was narrowly
drawn within the guidelines enunciated in Fuentes. A comparison
of the statute in Calero with the New Orleans Towing Ordinance
results in the conclusion that the provision in the New Orleans
statute authorizing the seizure of vehicles was drawn in compliance
with Fuentes. The Remm statute described the type of vehicle (un-
occupied) which would be subject to seizure if found violating a
traffic law. In addition, only a police officer or duly authorized
person had the power to remove the vehicle."
A recent case, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,83 seems
to indicate that the decision in Mitchell is an exception to Fuentes
when the procedural safeguards set out in Mitchell are present."
73. Id. at 606.
74. Id. at 604.
75. Id. at 607-8.
76. Id. at 608-10.
77. 407 U.S. at 86-87.
78. 416 U.S. 663 (1973).
79. Id. at 665.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 418 F. Supp. at 544.
83. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
84. Id. at 606-7; See also note 71 supra.
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North Georgia involved a garnishment procedure which authorized
an officer or clerk of the court to issue a writ of garnishment upon
the showing of conclusory allegations. 5 Under the statute the credi-
tor was required to file a bond for the protection of the debtor.
There was no provision concerning notice or a hearing. 7 The only
method of dissolving the garnishment was for the debtor to file a
bond for the protection of the creditor." As the debtor did not have
a method to challenge the garnishment unless he filed the bond, 9
the Court found that the Georgia statute violated the due process
clause for the same reasons as the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes
in Fuentes.9° The provision in question could have been found un-
constitutional under Mitchell as well; nevertheless, the Court anal-
ogized the situation to Fuentes, appearing to reaffirm it."
The North Georgia decision cannot be considered a complete reaf-
firmation of Fuentes. The decision discussed the strict Fuentes stan-
dard but not in the context of the particular property interest at
issue.92 Instead of examining the factual situation to determine
whether or not a possessory interest had been affected, the Court
returned to a balancing test (which Fuentes had rejected) when it
considered that the "probability of irreparable injury . . .is suffi-
ciently great so that some procedures are necessary to guard against
the risk of initial error. '9 3 In determining whether due process pro-
tections were necessary, the Court was concerned with the degree
of injury as opposed to the fact of injury regardless of its nature as
Fuentes would have required.
The standard of procedural due process as applied by the Su-
85. The statute at issue in North Georgia required that the creditor state the "amount
[he] claimed to be due [that he] has reason [tol apprehend loss of same or some part
thereof unless . . . garnishment shall issue." 419 U.S. at 602.
86. Id. at 603.
87. Id. at 605.
88. Id. at 607.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 606.
91. 419 U.S. at 606-07. The Court noted that the Georgia garnishment statute (which
was the issue of the case) did not have the "saving characteristics" found in the statute in
Mitchell. Id. at 607. Relying on this would have been enough to find the GeQ.rgia statute
unconstitutional without a further analysis under Fuentes. Instead it appears to limit
Mitchell to the situation where a statute has the same provisions as found in Mitchell and in
that select case the statute would be valid.
92. 419 U.S. at 606.
93. Id. at 608.
1977]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
preme Court today in summary seizure cases remains unclear. It
appears that the Court is moving away from the strict standard of
Fuentes to the balancing process of Mitchell and North Georgia.9"
Where the safeguards as set out by Mitchell are present, it seems
probable that Mitchell will be applied. In other situations, Fuentes
will govern though possibly limited by the holding in North Georgia.
In analyzing the issue of due process, Remm did not give suffi-
cient consideration to possible changes in the theory since Fuentes.
Judge Sears referred to Mitchell, but only in regard to the type of
hearing and notice required.95 The court did not consider what
Mitchell represented in the line of cases interpreting due process.
In general, Mitchell signalled the Supreme Court's return to the
application of the balancing test rather than following the strict
Fuentes test in every instance. Specifically, Mitchell resulted in
what could be considered an exception to Fuentes, when the proper
procedural safeguards as found in Mitchell are present. Although
the Remm analysis considered whether the extraordinary situations
exception to Fuentes would render the towing ordinance constitu-
tional, the Remm court did not examine the constitutional situation
in terms of Mitchell.
In order to obtain a seizure prior to notice or hearing, the statute
at issue in Mitchell set out the following requirements. The creditor
must submit a verified petition or affidavit to the court detailing the
nature of the claim, the factual situation, as well as the amounts
claimed due." In addition, it must appear that the debtor has the
power to alter or conceal the property to the creditor's detriment."
Only a judge has the authority to issue the writ upon the clear
presentation of a verified petition, and then only if the creditor files
a bond for the protection of the debtor.9" Upon seizure, the debtor
is entitled to an immediate dissolution of the writ which must be
ordered unless the creditor can prove his allegations. The debtor can
also regain possession of' the property regardless of whether he
moves to dissolve the sequestration by filing a bond for the protec-
94. Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1128-30 (3d Cir. 1976).
95. 418 F. Supp. at 548, fn. 12.
96. 416 U.S. at 605.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 605-6.
99. Id. at 606.
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tion of the creditor. 00
An application of the Mitchell test to the New Orleans City Tow-
ing Ordinance reveals that under Mitchell it is unlikely that the
second portion of the ordinance would be found constitutional. One
of the more serious deficiencies is that a judge is not the final au-
thority on whether or not the fees are collected. As the Remm court
noted, the collection is mandatory from all owners whose cars have
been subject to seizure. Other factors supporting such a conclusion
are the absence of a statutory requirement of a verified petition
asserting the facts, the filing of a bond for the protection of the
owner, and finally the immediacy of a hearing. Perhaps some of
these provisions would not be required, as there is a government
interest involved which already justifies the seizure of the car. Nev-
ertheless, the Mitchell Court's requirement that the authority to
issue such a writ be vested only in a judge'0' makes it unlikely that
a statute lacking this provision would be found constitutional.
The Supreme Court still appears to be following a balancing test,
particularly in light of North Georgia. However, where the statute
at hand does not justify a seizure prior to hearing or notice under
one of the two exceptions to Fuentes, the Court is continuing to give
greater weight to preserving a person's property interests until he
has had an opportunity to be heard. As a result, the state's interest
in collection of the towing charges and other fees would not outweigh
a person's right to a hearing before the fees are collected. The possi-
bility of irreparable injury is present because a person is deprived
not only of money to pay the fees but also of his means of transporta-
tion in a society where a car is almost an essential item.
As due process is interpreted today, the Remm analysis is a valid
application. Although the decision does not consider the changing
dimensions of due process, its basic reasoning is sound, viable, and
should endure. 02
Laurie S. Schaffer
100. Id. at 607.
101. Id. at 616.
102. As noted, the direction in which due process will evolve is unclear. In 1976, the
Supreme Court remanded a case for construction to the New York courts concerning a New
York attachment statute that was procedurally similar to Mitchell. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S.
73 (1976).
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